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German Sports Clubs’ Recruitment of Executive Board Members  
 
This paper analyzes the recruitment of executive board members for German sports 
clubs, an issue of key interest given that volunteers play a dominant role in these sports 
clubs. Based on a new, micro-level data set, we examine how members of a sports club 
advance to become executive board members and how board members differ from 
ordinary members. Based on the results of our study, we examine whether Michels’ 
“iron law of oligarchy” applies and whether democratic procedures for elections in 
sports clubs are replaced, even in part, by trust-based oligarchic structures. 
Key Words: Sports, Volunteering, Oligarchy, Sports clubs, Executive boards 
 
Introduction 
German sports club organizations are characterized by a bottom-up membership democracy 
that builds on the voluntary engagement and commitment of their members (Heinemann & 
Horch, 1981). Hence, a sports club can be defined as a resource pool of time, money, 
knowledge, and social capital that is voluntarily provided by its members. These resources are 
means to affect decision-making in a sports club and its broader environment (Emrich, 2008, 
2009; Vanberg, 1982). Decisions made in a sports club are aimed at the production of the 
club’s goods or services (Buchanan, 1965; for an extension of Buchanan’s theory in a sports-
specific context, see Pierdzioch, Emrich & Balter, 2013). To this end, a sports club must solve 
three interrelated problems involving the contribution, delegation, and distribution of 
resources (Gassmann et al., 2017). The contribution problem concerns the decentralized input 
of resources provided by members to produce a club’s goods or services. The distribution 
problem affects the allocation of the club’s goods among the members in such a way that 
members’ expectations are met over the long term. Finally, the delegation problem pertains to 




The delegation problem is typically solved before the contribution and distribution 
problems are addressed, because the members of a sports club’s executive board are elected at 
the general meeting. Only after being elected can the executive board members decide on the 
production and distribution of the club goods or services; as such, the election of the 
executive board members can be seen as a trust-based delegation of authority. In addition, a 
trust-based exchange occurs between a member’s vote and future chances to participate in the 
consumption of the club goods produced by means of voluntary work. This exchange must be 
organized in a way such that the expectations of voters (i.e., members of the sports club) are 
met over the long run (Gassmann et al., 2017).  
Results of earlier research suggest that recruiting sports club members to volunteer—
and, in particular, to become executive board members—are key problems for German sports 
clubs (Breuer & Feiler, 2016; Schlesinger & Nagel, 2013; Heinemann & Horch, 1981). These 
researchers found that volunteers’ willingness to become executive board members is rather 
limited, with some past studies arguing that the overall system of sports clubs is experiencing 
a crisis rooted in the absence of voluntary engagement and difficulties in recruiting volunteers 
for their executive boards. Upon comparing the difference between the number of total 
positions and the number of elected persons on executive boards, Emrich, Pitsch and 
Papathanassiou (2001; see also Pitsch, 1999, and Pitsch & Emrich, 1997; for a longitudinal 
study see Anthes, 2009) show, however, that the gap in voluntary engagement in German 
sports clubs is not yet at crisis levels. Thieme, Liebetreu and Wallrodt (2017) review the 
problem of recruiting executive board members and argue that reporting such a problem is a 
rational strategy for them to gain attention and enhance their social reputation. 
Adams (1980) describes the process of becoming a board member for the American 
Red Cross (ARC), which is a voluntary organization that mainly produces goods for external 
consumers rather than for members (in contrast to sports clubs). He finds that social-heritage 
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mechanisms matter insofar as male executive board members “inherit” their position from 
family members, while others receive their board membership directly from a vacating 
member and are asked to join the board, a form of co-optation. Some male executive board 
members are requested directly because of specialized skills, primarily in the fields of finance, 
taxes, and law, whereas female executive board members often “[…] were ‘promoted’ to elite 
positions from inside the organization” (Adams, 1980, p. 96).  Hence, men start their career 
from outside of the ARC, “[w]hile the women make their way to the top of the organization 
inside the chapter […]” (Adams, 1980, p. 96). 
According to Hovden (2000, p. 76), in sports organizations, persons in leading 
positions and elected members are often “[…] highly educated, affluent, middle-aged, in full-
time employment and have had more administrative experience than the average member.” 
These findings confirm the early results of Milbrath and Klein (1962), who report a link 
between a person’s socioeconomic status and their level of political participation. An 
explanation for this link is given by Frey (1971, p. 103), who argues that “[c]itizens with 
high-paying jobs are more used to deal[ing] with political questions which are in principle of 
the same character as their daily work, and which are therefore done much more efficiently.” 
In this regard, it is also likely that socioeconomic status affects people’s level of volunteerism 
as well as their reasons for engaging in volunteer work.1 
Based on a new, micro-level data set, this study discusses the following two research 
questions:  
                                                 
1 Three main economic models explain why people volunteer. First, the public-goods model, which stipulates 
that the production of a public good and, thus, altruism, is a key motive for doing volunteer work. Second, 
the private-consumption model assumes that private utility (e.g., derived from the “warm glow” feeling, or 
from social interactions or social standing) is the main motivation for volunteering. Third, the human-capital 
model rests on the assumption that volunteering increases special skills that may be useful for a volunteer’s 
job and helps them to build networks that are important for a volunteer’s (future) career (Emrich & 
Pierdzioch, 2015, 2016). 
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(1) How do members of sports clubs become executive board members, and how do 
executive board members differ from ordinary members?  
(2) Does Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” apply, and are democratic procedures for 
elections in sports clubs partly replaced by trust-based oligarchic structures? 
The Iron Law of Oligarchy 
Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” (1957; Figure 1; for a brief overview, see Lipset, 1962) 
sheds light on (1) organizational conditions that facilitate the emergence of oligarchic 
structures, (2) how the elected gain power, even in democratic systems, as a specific form of 
“democratic” organization, and (3) structural conditions that promote this process. 
Organizational conditions that facilitate the emergence of oligarchic structures relate to the 
two aims of an oligarchy—continuity and stability and a strong desire of sovereignty—that 
spread into the following three dimensions:  
• Psychology of the individual, which means that a person needs special knowledge, 
personal competence, and/or expertise to become an elected leader in an organization.  
• Needs of the organization, which comes into play when an organization expands. In 
such a situation, administrative tasks become more and more complex, and the 
organization will need persons with special skills, competences, and ties. 
• Psychology of the crowd, which is based on the notation of a natural “group 
incompetence” with regard to self-regulation and the management of a system of 
traditions and forms of gratitude.  
All three dimensions induce a specific type of bureaucracy that leads to the perception 
among the organization’s members that there is a need to have people with special skills at the 
top to lead and make decisions. As a result, oligarchy in democratic organizations can be 
described as a system in which members prefer personal “inactivity” more than “development 
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of self-interests,” whereas the leaders prefer “development of self-interests” more than 
“inactivity” (Wippler, 1985, p. 29). Enjolras and Waldahl (2010, p. 216), who base their 
research on Michel’s iron law of oligarchy in Norwegian sports organizations, state that “[…] 
executive control is in the hands of those at the top, leaving the membership with little real 
power.” Wippler (1985) describes the dilemma that, because members’ preferences and 
action/inaction may have unintended consequences, democratic actions and procedures often 
can result in oligarchic structures. 
Going one step further, an “elite“ (or a group of authorities) can be interpreted as an 
intraclub network (often termed “an old-boys network” or “old-boys club”), comprised of 
executive board members who share and support the agenda of the executive board and who 
share a specific social status. The formation of an elite has been viewed in earlier research as 
a precondition for the emergence of an oligarchy (Perkins & Poole, 1996). Building on the 
terminology developed by Michels (1957), Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) describe the 
process of elite formation as the domination of a few over many and the formation of cliques. 
Cassinelli (1953) argues along these same lines; in his view, organizations consist of people 
who provide order for others, where the latter are, therefore, usually not members of the elite 
(for circulation of elites, see Mosca, 1950, and Pareto, 1955; for leadership elites in 
organizations, Pettigrew, 1992). Similarly, Emrich, Papathanassiou and Pitsch (1996) describe 
“rope teams,” which is a specific form of closed relationships within an organization (on 
closed relationships, see Weber 1978). They describe these rope teams as social networks of a 
specific quality (i.e., strong ties) that are only explainable by means of a trust-based and long-
term examination of behavior. They illustrate this special type of social relationship through a 
case study that is based on an intensive and long-standing observation by the authors, wherein 
members of rope teams establish and defend processes and techniques that protect and extend 




Figure 1: Etiology scheme to describe oligarchic structures in democratic parties (own translation based on 
Michels, 1957, p. 368). 
Operationalization  
Which sociodemographic characteristics make a person more likely to become an executive 
board member? Building on earlier research (see Table 1) and using the theoretical findings of 
Michels’ iron law of oligarchy, we consider the following to be characteristics related to this 
advancement:  
When a person’s parents already work or worked as volunteers (not necessarily in the 
same sports club), then such a person is likely to have better access to resources (both 
material and networks) than persons whose parents did not work as volunteers. Parental 
volunteering may also establish a kind of family tradition of volunteering, raising the 
likelihood that a person will become an executive board member of a sports club.  
Gender also may play a role, because male volunteers may have better access to old-
boys networks.  
Similarly, age may be another important characteristic because becoming a member of 
an old-boys network and developing the trust-based relations on which such networks 
are built requires time.  
The number of years that a volunteer has worked in a specific executive position is 
likely to matter as well because of learning-by-doing considerations, and because other 
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members of a sports club may view a long-time executive board member as a “natural” 
part of the inside elite group.  
Additionally, income is likely to matter because only financially independent 
individuals have the resources to take on a leading position as a board member, wherein 
high income is likely to be a good proxy for a volunteer’s administrative and 
management skills as well as habitual capital. At the same time, however, a high 
income may signal that the opportunity costs of doing volunteer work are high.  
Education and job-market position are also characteristics that are likely to govern a 
volunteer’s access to resources, and they proxy a volunteer’s expertise, general skills, 
and self-confidence.  
Time allocation may correlate with high income, where some volunteers may find it 
difficult to reconcile their voluntary work with their career and family obligations that 
naturally arise when a volunteer has a child or children. At the same time, however, 
having children may be a major motivation for becoming a volunteer in a sports club 
(although not necessarily for becoming an executive board member).  
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Instrument and Data 
We collected our data by means of an online questionnaire conducted from May 29, 2016, to 
June 30, 2016. The link to the online questionnaire was sent to approximately 14,000 
registered volunteers mined from the database of the Sportbund Pfalz e. V. (a regional sports 
association of Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany).  Sportbund Pfalz e.V. was interested in 
studying the motives of sports club members in their region and to give information to sports 
clubs, for example, as to how to recruit volunteers. 
We asked volunteers several questions regarding their volunteer work, motives for doing 
volunteer work, and their sociodemographic status. Completing the questionnaire took 
approximately 20–30 minutes. In total, 3,067 volunteers (a 21.9% response ratio) participated 
in the survey, though not every respondent answered all questions. The sample used for this 
analysis includes 1,717 elected volunteers (executive board members) and 1,124 non-elected 




Tables 2-4 summarize the statistics for two groups of volunteers: those who are executive 
board members (executives), and other volunteers (non-executives who do other voluntary 
work in sports clubs, such as coaching a team). Executives are significantly older and spent 
more hours per week in their voluntary position than non-executives. At the same time, 
executives have been in their position for a slightly shorter period of time than non-
executives, but both executives and non-executives have volunteered for about 12 years in 
their current position, indicating that both types of volunteering are rather persistent (Table 2). 
Executives are, to a higher extent, male, have children, and are more likely to have had 
parents who volunteered (Table 3). Male executives mainly take the position of chairman 
(82%) and vice-chairman (83%), while female executives tend to be secretary (48%) or 
assessor (43%). Executives also have a higher income than non-executives, and executives 
work to a higher percentage in managerial positions than non-executives. There are no 
significant differences in education between the two groups (Table 4). 
 
Table 2: Socioeconomic variables I (N = sample; SD = standard deviation; p = level of significance, d = Cohen’s 
effect size). 
Executives Non-executives t-Test   
N Mean±SD N Mean±SD  
    t(2353) = -9.60 
1506 49.65±14.25 849 43.61±15.37           p =  0.00 Age (N = 2355) 
              d =  0.19 
    t(2533) = -9.2 
1617 7.80±6.42 918 5.53±5.14           p = 0.00 
Hours spent as volunteer 
per week (N = 2535) 
              d = 0.14 
    t(2418) = 0.6 
1555 12.54±11.81 865 12.81±11.07           p = 0.07 Years in position (N = 2420) 









Table 3: Socioeconomic variables II (N = sample; p = level of significance; V = Cramer’s effect size). 
Executives Non-executives 
  
N Percent [%] N Percent [%] 
² 
Female 522 33.7 472 53.8 
Gender (N = 
2428) Male 1028 66.3 406 46.2 
² = 92.65 
p = 0.00 
V = 0.20 
Yes 926 58.1 505 55.7 Parental 
volunteering 
(N = 2501) No 668 41.9 402 44.3 
² = 1.28 
p = 0.27 
 V = 0.00 
Yes 979 67.9 489 59.0 
Children (N = 
2270) No 462 32.1 340 41.0 
² = 18.07  
p = 0.00 
V = 0.09 
 
Table 4: Socioeconomic variables III (N = sample; p = level of significance; Z = test value; d = Cohen’s effect 
size; V = Cramer’s effect size). 
Executives Non-executives  
  
N Percent % N Percent %  
under 1000€ 97 7.1 101 13.6 
1000€-1500€ 91 6.6 52 7.0 
1500€-2000€ 155 11.3 76 10.3 
2000€-2500€ 195 14.2 97 13.1 
2500€-3000€ 198 14.4 124 16.7 
3000€-4000€ 284 20.7 143 19.3 
Income (N = 
2116) 
more than 4000€ 355 25.8 148 20.0 
U-Test  
p =  0.00  
z = -3.973 
d =  0.09 
1 199 14.9 225 28.2 
2 88 6.6 29 3.6 
3 99 7.4 42 5.3 
4 358 26.8 220 27.6 
5 92 6.9 31 3.9 
6 354 26.5 194 24.3 
Job2 (N = 
2134) 
7 147 11.0 56 7.0 
Pearson ²- 
test 
     p = 0.00 
²(6) = 73.14 
     V = 0.19 
1 65 4.3 81 9.5 
2 453 29.7 241 28.2 
3 377 24.7 157 18.4 
4 310 20.3 145 17.0 
Vocational 
education3 
(N = 2378) 
5 319 20.9 230 26.9 
U-Test 
p =  0.956 
z = -0.06 
d =  0.00 
 
 
                                                 
2 Job 1: pupil, student, vocational training, unskilled worker, homemaker; Job 2: skilled worker, vocational school, self-employed farmer; Job 
3: foreman, worker/clerk with simple tasks; Job 4: worker with qualified skills, middle-ranking clerk/official; Job 5: self-employed up to 9 
employees/partners; Job 6: high-qualified worker or worker in leading position, senior official, self-employed academic; Job 7: executive 
with extensive management tasks, self-employed more than 10 employees/partners 
3 Education 1: None; Education 2: technical/vocational training, still in education; Education 3: completed a professional training/ school for 




How do members of sports clubs become executive board members? From earlier 
research (Freeman, 1997), “being asked” is a significant factor that leads to a person 
becoming a volunteer. Our data show that being asked by a leading person of a sports club is 
significantly more important in the case of executives than in the case of non-executives 
(Figure 2). Non-executives are, to a higher extent, recruited by friends or family members. 
Compared with executives, an important reason for non-executives to become volunteers is 
their own experience. Being exposed to advertisements is not a reason for volunteering either 
for executives or for non-executives. 
Figure 2: How volunteers assumed their position (N = 2,489; non-executives: black bars; executives: white 
bars; test values: p< = 0.01**; p< = 0.05*, n.s. = not significant; Cramer’s V as effect size). 
 
Given that the necessary skills for a position on the executive board differ from those 
for non-executive volunteer work, it is not surprising that the two types of volunteers differ 
with respect to the (self-reported) necessary skills for their positions (Figure 3). We found 
differences in the mean assessment of self-reported organizational skills, level of 
commitment, skills in dealing with authorities (such as state authorities), resilience, and 
selflessness, wherein executives emphasized to a higher extent than non-executives the 
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importance of these skills. Non-executives, in contrast, emphasized the importance of skills 
related to dealing with people. Interestingly, we found no difference between the two groups 
in regard to the self-reported importance of leadership skills. 
 
Fi
gure 3: Mean assessment of skills for voluntary positions from 1 (low extent) to 5 (high extent). (level of 
significance: p< =0.01**; n.s. = not significant; t = t-test-value; d = Cohen’s effect size). 
 
Upon estimating a binary logistic regression model (Table 5), we studied in a multivariate 
setting potential sociodemographic characteristics that influence the probability of a person 
becoming an executive rather than a non-executive volunteer. The estimated model has a 
Pseudo McFadden fit of approximately 0.095 (Nagelkerke 0.160) and results show that 

































effect on the probability of becoming an executive volunteer, indicating that network 
effects and family traditions play a role in whether a volunteer assumes an executive position 
Logistic regression N 1,645 






   
   
Executive board members Coef. Std. Err. 
   
Parental engagement (Yes) 0.20+ 0.11 
Gender (male) 0.51** 0.12 
Kids (Yes) -0.30+ 0.15 
Age 0.03** 0.01 
Years in position -0.03** 0.01 
Hours per week 0.08** 0.01 
   
Salary: <1000 € (reference)   
1001-1500 € 0.19 0.29 
1501-2000 € 0.11 0.27 
2001-2500 € 0.17 0.26 
2501-3000 € -0.19 0.25 
3001-4000 € -0.14 0.25 
>4000 € 0.32 0.25 
   
Job 1 (reference)   
Job 2 0.52+ 0.30 
Job 3 0.69* 0.29 
Job 4 0.19 0.20 
Job 5 0.48 0.31 
Job 6 0.23 0.22 
Job 7 0.56* 0.29 
   
Education 1 (reference)   
Education 2 0.39 0.27 
Education 3 0.39 0.28 
Education 4  0.44 0.28 
Education 5 -0.04 0.26 
   
Constant -1.78** 0.29 
For job and education information see footnotes 1 and 2 in Table 4. 
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in a sports club. The time (in years) that a volunteer has spent in an executive position, in 
contrast, has a significant negative effect. This could be because some sports clubs have 
restrictions with regard to the time that a person can stay in an executive position. Time 
constraints due to having children have only a weak negative significant effect, while income 
(net income of a household) and education have no significant effects. As for the influence of 
job-market position, we observe that working as a laborer or foreman and working in a 
managerial position both have a significantly positive effect on becoming an executive 
volunteer. In contrast, the coefficients estimated for volunteers in the intermediate groups 
“qualified laborer,” “self-employed,” and “highly qualified laborer” are not significantly 
different from zero; hence, it seems that the executive boards of German sports clubs are 
composed of board members who can meet the operational demands of managing a sports 
club as well as those who are responsible for performing managerial work. 
17 
 
Summary and Discussion  
Hovden (2000, p. 76-77), who cites Mancur Olson’s view that “[…]businessmen are 
increasingly being asked to sit on boards of sports clubs in order to professionalize their 
operations,” argues that the selection of candidates is based on incumbency, personal- and 
performance-based leadership skills, and an agreement with the organizational policies of the 
club. Our results shed light on whether a similar proposition can be made with regard to the 
executive boards of, in particular, German sports clubs, revealing that executive volunteers in 
German sports clubs are when they bring special knowledge from their jobs into the 
organization, where job-market skills, organizational skills, and skills in dealing with external 
agencies seem to matter more than formal education and specific leadership skills. In addition, 
age, gender, and (to a lesser extent) parental volunteering affect the probability that a person 
will become an executive board member of a sports club, as does being asked by a leading 
person within the sports club. These results, where “being asked by a leader” matters along 
with age, gender, and parental volunteering (and, thus, family tradition and established 
networks) suggests that German sports clubs rely on old-boys-networks to recruit candidates 
for board positions.4  
Emrich and Papathanassiou (2003) argue that elections at the general assembly of 
German sports clubs are not truly democratic procedures but rather instruments to corroborate 
and demonstrate the status of traditional elites and intraclub authorities. As a result, they 
argue that “neo-feudalistic” structures dominate in German sports clubs, where elected 
                                                 
4 Hence, there is a role for the type of “rope teams” described by Emrich et al. (1996). It should also be noted 
that we estimated the regression model (for those who are executive board members) given in Table 5 with 
the dependent variable replaced by the variable “being asked by a leader.” These results are not reported 
here, but are available from the authors upon request. We found that the model has virtually no 
explanatory power; in other words, the socioeconomic variables we study in the regression model do not 
predict who is “being asked by a leader,” lending support to the view that other factors, such as being 
member of an old-boys-network, are important when persons who assume leading positions in a sports club 
recruit candidates for board positions. 
18 
 
representatives are distinguished members who are quite different from those who have 
elected them (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010, p. 226). In fact, a characteristic feature of German 
sports clubs’ general assemblies is that there is very seldom more than one candidate for an 
open position on the board, and this scenario is so well-understood by all participants that 
makes it difficult for potential opposing candidates to run without presumed negative effects. 
In addition, potential opposing candidates know that there is no chance of being elected when 
they lack the recommendation of a leading person. Researchers, therefore, have argued that 
the type of representative democracy characteristic of German sports clubs mixes democratic 
and aristocratic principles (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010; Emrich & Papathanassiou, 2003; in 
general, Halbwachs, 1950). 
Max Weber (1972, p. 21) provides an explanation for this phenomenon when he 
wrote: “[…] in reality the authority is always a minority rule, sometimes a dictatorship of 
individuals, the rule of one or more persons qualified by selection or by adaptation for the 
tasks of leadership.” Perkins and Poole (1996, p. 84) find the same tendencies for social 
differentiation when they investigated oligarchic tendencies in an all-volunteer American fire 
department. They describe the special social structures at the top of organizations as “[…] 
cliques, nepotism and domination by a few” (see also Emrich & Papathanassiou, 2003, and 
Emrich et al., 1996; on the incentives for an educated oligarchy wherein societies subsidize 
the education of the poor and initiate a democratic transition, Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000). 
Leadership is present in nearly every type of social system; as such, the issue is not 
whether oligarchic structures in sports clubs are, in principle, “good” or “bad”5; rather, 
whether oligarchic structures in democratic organizations like sports clubs imply that 
                                                 
5 A potential damaging effect of intraclub networks, of course, is that such networks tend to support corruption 
(Hiller, 2005). Nye (1967, p. 419) states that “corruption is behaviour which deviates from the formal duties 
of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; 
or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (for ars corrumpendi, 
Emrich, 2005; for a sociological approach, Hiller, 2005). 
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leadership and its development do not agree in total with the principles of democracy 
(Michels, 1957, p. 369); in addition, oligarchic structures in democratic organizations also 
allow such organizations to survive better than those that lack these internal structures 
(Perkins & Poole, 1996). Oligarchic structures, therefore, can be interpreted as a kind of 
organizational self-insurance against adverse environmental influences (Thiel & Meier, 2004). 
In a sense, the complexity of club matters, passivity of members, and unequal opportunity of 
access to resources lead, in a natural process, toward power appropriation by specialists 
(Enjolras & Waldahl, 2010), implying that expertise and bureaucracy both lead to the 
emergence of hierarchical structures in sports clubs (Heinemann & Horch, 1981). At the same 
time, oligarchic structures naturally establish a circular system that is tailored to guarantee 
self-preservation, resulting from the unwillingness of those belonging to the ruling elite group 




The authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or 
entity with any financial or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed 




Adams, D.S. (1980). Elite and Lower Volunteers in a Voluntary Association: A Study of an 
American Red Cross Chapter. Journal of Voluntary Action Research, 9(1-4), 95-118. 
Anthes, E. (2009). Strukturelle Entwicklungen in Sportvereinen. Eine empirische Analyse im 
Sportbund Pfalz. Göttingen: Cuvilliere. 
Breuer, C., & Feiler, S. (2016). Sportvereine in Deutschland. Available at: 
https://www.dosb.de/sportentwicklung/sportentwicklungsbericht/ (accessed 4 July 
2018). 
Bourguignon, F., & Verdier, T. (2000). Oligarchy, Democracy, Inequality and Growth. 
Journal of Development Economics, 62, 285-313.  
Buchanan, J.M. (1965). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, New Series, 32, 1-14.  
Cassinelli, C.W. (1953). The Law of Oligarchy. The American Political Science Review, 47, 
773-784. 
Emrich, E., & Pierdzioch, C. (2015). Testing economic models of volunteer labour supply: 
some empirical evidence for the German Red Cross. Applied Economics, 47, 4247-4259. 
Emrich, E. (2005). „Ars Corrumpendi“. Zur Interaktions- und Beziehungsdynamik bei 
Bestechungen. Sozialersinn, 7(2), 327-343. 
Emrich, E., & Pierdzioch, C. (2016). A Quantile-Regression Test of Economic Models of 
Volunteer Labor Supply. Economics Bulletin, 36(1), 198-204. 
Emrich, E. (2008). Sportverbände. In K. Weis & R. Gugutzer (Eds.), Handbuch 
Sportsoziologie (pp.122-132). Schorndorf: Hofmann. 
Emrich, E. (2009). Organisationstheoretische Besonderheiten des Sports. In C. Breuer & A. 
Thiel (Eds.), Handbuch Sportmanagement (2nd ed.) (pp. 103-121). Schorndorf: 
Hofmann. 
Emrich, E., & Papathanassiou, V. (2003). Zur Führungskultur in assoziativen Systemen. 
Aspekte machtzentrierter traditionaler Denk- und Handlungsmuster im Sportsystem. 
German Journal of Exercise and Sport Research, 33(3), 239-262. 
Emrich, E., Pitsch, W., & Papathanassiou, V. (2001). Die Sportvereine. Ein Versuch auf 
empirischer Grundlage. Schorndorf: Hofmann. 
Emrich, E., Papathanassiou, V., & Pitsch, W. (1996). Klettertechnik für Aufsteiger. 
Seilschaften als soziales Phänomen. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, 48(1), 141-155. 
Enjolras, B., & Waldahl, R.H. (2010). Democratic Governance and Oligarchy in Voluntary 
Sport Organizations: The Case of the Norwegian Olympic Committee and 
Confederation of Sports. European Sport Management Quarterly, 10, 215-239. 
Erlinghagen, M., Saka, B., & Steffentorweihen, I. (2016). Führungspositionen im Ehrenamt – 
ein weiterer Bereich der Benachteiligung von Frauen? Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie 
und Sozialpsychologie, 68(4), 647-673. 
Frey, B.S. (1971). Why do High Income People Participate More in Politics? Public Choice, 
11, 101-105. 
Freeman, R.B. (1997). Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor. Journal of 
Labour Economics, 15, 140-166. 
Gassmann, F., Emrich, E., & Pierdzioch, C. (2017). Sportvereinsforschung aus der Sicht des 
methodologischen Individualismus. In L. Thieme (Ed.), Der Sportverein – Versuch 
einer Bilanz (pp. 479-503). Schorndorf: Hofmann. 
Halbwachs, M. (1950). La mémoire collective. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Heinemann, K. & Horch, H.D. (1981). Soziologie der Sportorganisation. German Journal of 
Exercise and Sport Research, 11, 123-150.  
Hiller, P. (2005). Korruption und Netzwerke. Konfusionen im Schema von Organisationen 
und Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie, 26, 57-77. 
22 
 
Hovden, J. (2000). Gender and Leadership Selection Processes in Norwegian Sporting 
Organizations. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 35, 75-82. 
Lipset, S.M. (1962). Michels’ theory of political parties. New York: Crowell-Collier. 
Lipset, S.M., Trow, M.A., & Coleman, J.S. (1956). Union democracy. New York: Free Press. 
Michels, R. (1957). Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie (2nd ed.). 
Stuttgart: Kroener. 
Milbrath, L.W., & Klein, W.W. (1962). Personality Correlates of Political Participation. Acta 
Sociologica, 6, 53-66.  
Mosca, B. (1950). Die herrschende Klasse. Bern: Francke. 
Nye, J.S. (1967). Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. The 
American Political Science Review, 61, 417-427. 
Pareto, V. (1955). Allgemeine Soziologie. Stuttgart: Enke. 
Perkins, K.B., & Poole, D.G. (1996). Oligarchy and Adaptation to Mass Society in an All-
Volunteer Organization: Implications for Understanding Leadership, Participation, and 
Change. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 25(1), 73-88. 
Pettigrew, A. (1992). On Studying Managerial Elites. Strategic Management Journal, 13, 
163-182. 
Pierdzioch, C., Emrich, E., & Balter, J. (2013). Ehrenamt in Sportvereinen und optimale 
Klubgröße – eine kurze Skizze. In K. Kempf, S. Nagel & H. Dietl (Eds.), Im Schatten 
der Sportwirtschaft (pp. 129-147). Schorndorf: Hofmann. 
Pitsch, W. (1999). Ideologische Einflüsse in der empirischen Sozialforschung im Sport. 
Aufgezeigt am Beispiel der Untersuchung von Sportvereinen. Köln: Sport und Buch 
Strauß. 
Pitsch, W., & Emrich, E. (1997). Die Krise des Ehrenamtes? Eine neue Analyse alter Daten. 
Sportwissenschaft, 27(4), 391-408. 
Perkins, K.D., & Poole, D.G. (1996). Oligarchy and Adaptation to Mass Society in an All-
Volunteer Organization: Implications for Understanding Leadership, Participation, and 
Change. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 25(1), 73-88. 
Schlesinger, T., & Nagel, S. (2013). How do sport clubs recruit volunteers? Analyzing and 
developing a typology of decision-making processes on recruiting volunteers in sport 
clubs. Sport Management Review, 18, 193-206. 
Smith, D.H., & Baldwin, B.R. (1974). Parental Socialization, Socioeconomic Status, and 
Volunteer Organization Participation. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 3(3-4), 59-
66. 
Thiel, A., & Meier, H. (2004). Survival through Resistance – About the Learning Capability 
of Sports Organizations. Sport and Society, 1(2), 103-124. 
Thieme, L., Liebetreu, T., & Wallrodt, S. (2017). Recruitment and retention of board 
members in sport clubs. The size of the problem and its causes. German Journal of 
Exercise and Sport Research, 47, 133-148. 
Vanberg, V. (1982). Markt und Organisation. Tübingen: Mohr. 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Weber, M. (1972). Max Weber’s proposal for the sociological study of voluntary associations. 
Journal of Voluntary Action Research, 1, 20-23. 
Wippler, R. (1985). Die Entstehung oligarchischer Strukturen in demokratisch verfassten 
Organisationen. In G. Büschges & W. Raub (Eds.), Soziale Bedingungen – individuelles 
Handeln – soziale Konsequenzen (pp. 23-48). Frankfurt: Lang.  
 
 
 
